1.Requirement

5.1.5.1 The Software Assurance Plan(s) shall be developed and documented per NASA-STD-8739.8, NASA Software Assurance Standard.

1.2 Notes

NPR 7150.2 does not include any notes for this requirement.

1.3 Applicability Across Classes

Key:    A_SC = Class A Software, Safety-Critical | A_NSC = Class A Software, Not Safety-Critical | ... | - Applicable | - Not Applicable
^X - Applicable with details, read above for more | P(C) - P(Center), follow center requirements or procedures

2. Rationale

Software assurance activities ensure that the project team implements software engineering products and processes according to the plans established by the project and comply with requirements in the NASA Software Assurance Standard. The NASA Software Assurance Standard ²⁷⁸captures the assurance requirements in a single place for more uniform application across projects where software is developed or acquired for NASA.

The Software Assurance Plan represents an agreement between the project, the software developers and the software assurance personnel. It describes the activities, roles, and responsibilities of software assurance on the project. As with any task, a plan helps ensure that the team performs all necessary and required tasks. Development of that plan provides the opportunity for stakeholders to give input and assist with the documentation and tailoring of the planned activities for the project.

Specific to software assurance, the NASA Software Assurance Standard ²⁷⁸provides requirements that the team can use as the basis for development of a project's software assurance plan. Using this previously thought-out, defined set of requirements gives plan development teams a common starting point for their activities and ensures that all software assurance plans include and address the same key tasks and assurance activities.

3. Guidance

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For projects that involve contracted work, both the acquirer and the provider (subcontractor), need Software Assurance Plans and those plans must work together to accomplish the required level of software assurance. The preliminary acquirer plan is developed at the same time the Request for Proposal (RFP) or Memorandum of Agreement/Understanding (MOA/U) is created. Both acquirer and provider plans are to be completed by the time the contract is awarded, though an update of the provider plan is expected at the SwRR.

As with many project plans, the Software Assurance Plan (SAP) may be a separate document or may be combined with another project plan such as the Software Development Plan (SDP).  However, the independent software assurance organization of the Acquirer SMA Office needs to have sign-off authority on the content no matter what document the SAP contents may be incorporated into.  The SAP is a joint agreement between Acquirer SMA and the project/facility for software assurance activities.

While the NASA Software Assurance Standard ²⁷⁸contains requirements for software assurance in general, it also contains minimum content requirements for the SAP.  The following requirements, identified by the NASA Software Assurance Standard paragraph numbers, apply specifically to the development and documentation of a SAP. These requirements, shown here without their associated project life cycle phase, provide a high-level content overview of both the acquirer and provider SAPs. When carrying out these requirements, consult the NASA Software Assurance Standard ²⁷⁸to determine the specific life cycle phase in which they are to be completed.

Acquirer SAP:

• 5.1.2.8 - Prepare a preliminary acquirer program/project software assurance plan documenting the planned level of software assurance effort and activities required and the necessary resources using the template provided in Appendix B [of the NASA Software Assurance Standard ²⁷⁸].
• 5.3.1.1 - Verify that the provider's software assurance plan meets contractual requirements.
• 5.3.1.2 - Verify that the acquirer's software assurance plan and the provider's software assurance plan are consistent, compatible, and are base-lined.

Provider SAP:

• 6.3.1 - Each software provider shall establish and maintain a software assurance plan that addresses all software development and maintenance activities.
  NOTE: For smaller projects, this plan may be incorporated in another project-planning document or may be a separate document. Larger projects may have a separate plan or more than one software assurance plan.
• 6.3.2 - The software assurance plan shall:
• 6.3.2.1 - Conform to IEEE 730-2002, IEEE Standard for Software Quality Assurance Plans ²¹⁸.
• 6.3.2.2 - In addition, address how the provider will implement the requirements of Sections 6.0 and 7.0 of this Standard [NASA Software Assurance Standard ²⁷⁸].

The NASA Software Safety Standard, NASA-STD-8719.13B, ²⁷¹also includes two requirements that address content to consider for the SAP:

• 6.2.2.1 - The ?[safety] analysis methodology [for software design] shall be recorded in an appropriate document (e.g., software safety plan or software assurance plan).
• 6.3.2.1 - The ?[safety] analysis methodology [for software implementation, e.g., code] shall be recorded in an appropriate document (e.g., software safety plan or software assurance plan).

Before writing a SAP, it is recommended that the team review the following material as preparation:

• Software assurance lessons learned from similar projects
• Existing software assurance processes, standards, procedures, etc.
• Software assurance deliverables (records, reports, etc.) for similar projects

Using an existing template will ensure consistency of plans across projects as well as ensure all key information is included in the SAP. If a project or Center SAP template or "best-in-class" example does not exist, the NASA Software Assurance Standard, NASA-STD-8739.8, ²⁷⁸contains a basic outline in Appendix B. Templates are included in the Resources section of this guidance, including one from Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) based on the IEEE 730-2002 standard noted in the NASA Software Assurance Standard ²⁷⁸requirements which includes suggested content for each section of the SAP.

Other content elements to consider include:

• Software assurance organization and management structure and responsibilities
• Software assurance planning activities
• Software classification and safety criticality
• Software assurance implementation activities covering all 5 assurance disciplines:
  • Software Quality (includes software quality assurance, software quality engineering, and software quality control)
  • Software Safety
  • Software Reliability
  • Software Verification and Validation
  • Independent Verification and Validation
• Standards and processes to be used, including those used for:
  • Software assurance implementation activities such as reviews, audits, etc.
  • Problem reporting and tracking
  • Risk management
  • Software assurance metrics (e.g., planned vs. actual reviews, audits, assessments; open vs. closed issues; number of identified risks; etc.)
  • Record creation, review, and maintenance
• Training for software assurance personnel
• Resources, including tools, personnel, and facilities
• Identification of products and processes to be reviewed or audited
• Identification of deliverables (records) to be created and maintained
• Schedule

Ensure that the SAP is reviewed prior to implementation and at appropriate life cycle reviews by personnel with sufficient software assurance knowledge to identify omissions, inadequacies, and other issues. Include stakeholders affected by the plan in the reviews for awareness of planned activities and so that their suggestions can be addressed within the bounds of the project's required level of software assurance. Any identified issues need to be corrected prior to plan implementation or prior to carrying out affected software assurance activities in the next life cycle phase.

The following diagram excerpted from the Glenn Research Center SQA Process for Software Assurance, SEGP-SQA-PRC-1 ³⁸², shows a basic flow of activities for developing and documenting a SAP:

Any changes to the baselined SAP (typically baselined at

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The acquirer software assurance personnel are responsible for ensuring the provider software assurance personnel are meeting the contents of the provider SAP. The acquirer SAP describes how this will be done (based on software size, software class, safety-criticality, and other factors that may be specific to a project). 

Guidance related to software assurance and to be considered for inclusion in the SAP may be found in the following topics and requirements in this handbook:

4. Small Projects

According to the NASA Software Assurance Standard ²⁷⁸, smaller projects have the choice of incorporating their SAP in another project planning document or using a separate document.

5. Resources

• (SWEREF-119) Acquirer Software Assurance Plan template.
• (SWEREF-157)
  CMMI for Development, Version 1.3: Improving processes for developing better products and services,
  CMMI Development Team (2010). CMU/SEI-2010-TR-033, Software Engineering Institute.
• (SWEREF-218)
  IEEE Computer Society, "IEEE Standard for Software Quality Assurance Plans", IEEE 730-2002, 2002.
  IEEE 730-2002, 2002. NASA users can access IEEE standards via the NASA Technical Standards System located at https://standards.nasa.gov/. Once logged in, search to get to authorized copies of IEEE standards.
• (SWEREF-271)
  NASA Software Safety Standard,
  NASA STD 8719.13 (Rev C ) , Document Date: 2013-05-07
• (SWEREF-278)
  SOFTWARE ASSURANCE AND SOFTWARE SAFETY STANDARD
  NASA-STD-8739.8B , NASA TECHNICAL STANDARD, Approved 2022-09-08 Superseding "NASA-STD-8739.8A,
• (SWEREF-285)
  NPR 7150.2A Handbook, Topic 7.16 - Traceability of 7150.2 to NASA-STD-8739.8 (Standard for Software Assurance). See Tab 2.
• (SWEREF-324) Software Assurance Plan template, 2009. This NASA-specific information and resource is available in Software Processes Across NASA (SPAN), accessible to NASA-users from the SPAN tab in this Handbook.
• (SWEREF-433)
  Lessons Learned in Software Quality Assurance.
  Rosenberg, Dr. Linda H. NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). In Journal of Software Technology, Vol. 6, Number 2. October, 2003. Lessons Learned Reference.
• (SWEREF-450) SED Software Quality and IV&V Support Planning Guidelines, 580-GL-030-02, Software Engineering Division (SED), NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), 2012. This NASA-specific information and resource is available in Software Processes Across NASA (SPAN), accessible to NASA-users from the SPAN tab in this Handbook. Replaces SWEREF-229
• (SWEREF-502)
  Quality Assurance Expertise in Special Technical Areas (e.g., optics)
  Public Lessons Learned Entry: 331.
• (SWEREF-503)
  Quality Assurance Access to Critical Areas, Management
  Public Lessons Learned Entry: 332.
• (SWEREF-536)
  International Space Station (ISS) Program/Computer Hardware-Software/Software
  Public Lessons Learned Entry: 1062.

5.1 Tools

Tools to aid in compliance with this SWE, if any, may be found in the Tools Library in the NASA Engineering Network (NEN).

NASA users find this in the Tools Library in the Software Processes Across NASA (SPAN) site of the Software Engineering Community in NEN.

The list is informational only and does not represent an “approved tool list”, nor does it represent an endorsement of any particular tool. The purpose is to provide examples of tools being used across the Agency and to help projects and centers decide what tools to consider.

6. Lessons Learned

There must be a software assurance plan.  "Most Project Managers feel they have too many plans, and the suggestion of another one for Software Quality Assurance might be the proverbial straw that breaks the camel's back! But the success of any undertaking is to know what one is trying to achieve and how one expects to accomplish it, hence, the necessity of a plan for SQA. The plan will specify the goals, what is to be performed, standards against which the development work is to be measured, all relevant procedures, and the organizational structure of the Quality Assurance within the project. At NASA a software assurance plan is required." (Lesson 4 of 12, SoftwareTech News ⁴³³).

The NASA Lesson Learned database contains the following lessons learned related to software assurance planning:

• Quality Assurance Access to Critical Areas, Management (Quality Assurance Access). Lesson Number 0332:: "If program or engineering management exercises the authority to deny

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  access to critical areas, QA over-site will be severely [compromised]."  [Note that while this lesson does not specifically call out software, the lesson remains relevant regarding assurance personnel access to information and areas required to perform software assurance activities.] ⁵⁰³
• Quality Assurance Expertise in Special Technical Areas (e.g., optics) (Quality Assurance Expertise). Lesson Number 0331: "If quality assurance personnel responsible for oversight of the quality of highly technical state-of-the-art development do not have a degree of expertise in that technical area, the likelihood of discovering QA problems decreases significantly." [Note that while this lesson does not specifically call out software, the lesson remains relevant regarding assurance personnel access to information and areas required to perform software assurance activities.] ⁵⁰²
• International Space Station (ISS) Program/Computer Hardware-Software/Software (Schedules). Lesson Number 1062: "The

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  software development schedule is almost impossibly tight. If something else does not cause a further delay in ISS deployment, software development may very well do so. The decision this year to add integrated testing of some modules ... is a very positive step for safety. However, there is no room in the schedule for required changes that may be discovered during this testing." ⁵³⁶